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Abstract 
This paper describes an application of agent-based 
modeling to investigate the effect of a distance-based 
transaction cost on trade. Long-distance trade is 
rapidly increasing, but may ultimately be constrained 
by our ability to move material goods between sellers 
and buyers. Unlike information exchange, trade in 
material goods is dependent on the price of oil and 
vulnerable to future scarcities of oil. In addition, there 
are growing concerns about greenhouse gas 
emissions from long-distance transportation. Our 
purpose in this study is to take the first step in 
understanding the impact of a distance constraint on 
free global trade using a simple artificial economy. We 
use the perspective of agent-based computational 
economics to model two different scenarios of random 
initial allocations of goods among traders, and 
investigate the response of the economy as a 
distance-based transaction cost is applied. We show 
that a geographically skewed initial allocation of goods 
performs poorly, while a more uniform initial 
distribution responds in a highly resilient way as the 
transaction cost is varied. Underlying this resilience is 
the emergence of a stable trade network that has 
some of the properties of scale-free networks. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The rapid expansion of global trade is outpacing 
our understanding of the social and environmental 
consequences of trade. Trade is conducted 
increasingly over long distances and relies heavily on 
fossil fuels to transport goods from producers to 
consumers [1]. Even perishable products such as fruits 
and vegetables travel an average of 1500 miles (as of 
a few years ago) within the United States. When 
imported foods are added to the mix, the average 
distance from farm to the dinner table increases 
significantly. Most non-perishable items that we 
purchase – from toys to clothes to computers – are 
typically manufactured thousands of miles away.  
As long-distance trade increases, we are also 
witnessing significant increases in the price of oil, and 
growing concerns about greenhouse gas emissions 
from transportation and other sources. How would 
global trade change if some of the environmental costs 
– such as fossil fuel depletion and greenhouse gas 
emissions – are internalized? Alternately, what would 
be the effect of substantial increases in fuel costs due 
to increasing demand and decreasing supply? 
Concurrently, information technology has become 
commonplace in every part of the world. Information is 
increasingly available at a low cost in real time, with 
possibly a much lower environmental cost than long-
distance transportation of goods. Historically, one of 
the primary obstacles to free global trade has been the 
cost of accurate and timely information, including the 
ability to easily find and negotiate with trading 
partners.   Electronic trade exchanges and other 
Internet-based mechanisms are now beginning to 
remove this obstacle.  But the ultimate constraint to 
trade may well be our ability to physically move 
material goods from sellers to buyers over long 
distances at an acceptable cost including externalities. 
This constraint might lead to a restructuring of the fast-
growing society of global traders, and stimulate new 
kinds of trade relationships and networks. 
Our purpose in this study is to take the first step in 
understanding the impact of a distance constraint on 
free global trade using a simple artificial economy. We 
quantify this constraint as a distance-based 
transaction cost that traders must pay in order to 
transport goods to each other. We are interested in 
understanding how such a constraint would affect the 
outcomes of trade, such as the utility or welfare 
extracted by traders and the prices that traders pay for 
goods. We are also interested in exploring any 
geographical patterns that might emerge as a result of 
the transaction cost, such as trade networks with 
specific topologies.  
We proceed further by building on the substantial 
recent research in agent-based computational 
economics or ACE [2], which studies economies as 
evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents. 
ACE relies on computational laboratories to study the 
evolution of decentralized market economies under 
controlled experimental conditions. It is particularly 
appropriate for modeling the profit or utility seeking 
behavior of individual traders who are at different 
geographical locations with different sets of neighbors 
and have varying amounts of goods to trade.  
 
METHOD 
 
We formulate the trade problem as follows, 
adapting a simple barter economy used by Wilhite [3, 
4]. Our artificial world consists of 1024 traders spaced 
uniformly in the four quadrants of a rectangular space, 
as shown in Figure 1. Each trader is an agent who 
remains at a fixed location, and is able to trade with 
others who may be at other arbitrary locations. Traders 
are presumed to find potential trade partners and 
negotiate the terms of trade through mechanisms that 
are independent of their locations, such as globally-
accessible electronic trade exchanges. 
Each trader starts out with an initial endowment of 
two durable goods, g1 and g2, ranging from 0 to 1500 
units each. The two goods suffer no degradation over 
time and serve as assets that can be exchanged. 
There is no production and the aggregate stock of 
goods changes only to account for the transaction cost 
as described later. 
The initial allocation can follow two distinct 
scenarios, maintaining nearly equal amounts of g1 and 
g2 in our artificial world: 
• “Globally mixed random” (GMR): There are 
no regional differences. Each trader gets 
random quantities of the two goods such 
that the total quantity of both goods 
together is exactly 1500 units. 
• “Local comparative advantage random” 
(LCAR): The eastern half of the world has 
more g1 than g2, and the western half has 
more g2 than g1. Each trader in the east 
receives at least 1200 units of g1 and no 
more than 300 units of g2. Each trader in 
the west receives at least 1200 units of g2 
and no more than 300 units of g1. The 
actual amounts are allocated randomly 
such that each trader starts with a total 
quantity of 1500 units. 
 
 
Figure 1. Location of traders in the artificial world. 
 
Each trader attempts to maximize the same 
symmetric Cobb-Douglas utility function, U = g1 * g2. 
Traders are rational, non-strategic and myopic such 
that they do not plan for future opportunities or mislead 
potential trade partners. 
Trade proceeds as follows in this artificial world: 
• In each round of trade, traders are chosen 
in random order and each trader is given a 
chance to initiate four consecutive trades.  
• The trader then searches the world and 
finds the best possible trade partners for 
the four trades.  
• Two traders consummate a trade if their 
marginal rates of substitutions are different, 
and if the utilities (U = g1 * g2) of both 
traders increase as a result.  
• Trade price between agent i and agent k is 
determined by the following rule: Price = 
(g2i + g2k) / (g1i + g1k).  
• In each trade, the initiating trader buys or 
sells one unit of g1 in exchange for an 
appropriate quantity of g2. 
• Trade rounds proceed as above and 
terminate when there are no further 
profitable trading opportunities. 
In addition, traders take into account a transaction 
cost based on the distance between the two traders. 
This transaction cost reflects some degree of 
internalization of the real environmental costs of long-
distance trade, including fossil fuel depletion and 
greenhouse gas emissions. This cost can also simply 
reflect a high cost of petroleum-based fuels, quite 
apart from environmental costs. 
In each trade, the cost is paid by traders in 
proportion to the quantity of g1 or g2 bought and the 
distance that the goods must be transported. The cost 
is subtracted from the quantity of goods received by 
each trader in a trade. Traders evaluate this cost in 
advance and proceed with a trade only if it would still 
increase their utilities.  
The cost is computed as follows: Transaction cost 
= distance * quantity of goods bought * unit distance 
cost. For the purposes of this study, the unit distance 
cost can be one of the following: 0, 0.001, 0.05, 0.1, 
0.15, 0.2, or 0.25. Here, 0.001 would be a very low 
cost, while 0.25 would be very high. 
We assume that other trade-related activities, such 
as finding trade partners and negotiating the terms of 
trade, incur negligible transaction costs in relation to 
the distance-based cost. This could happen, for 
example, if these other activities are carried out over 
the Internet and largely automated through appropriate 
software. 
We have used NetLogo [5] to develop an agent-
based model of the simple barter economy described 
above. The purpose of the model and the subsequent 
simulation experiments is to generate new 
understanding and insights about the effects of a 
distance-based transaction cost.  
Our study of the simulation results starts with a 
close examination of the model economy in terms of 
macroeconomic behavior. We then investigate other 
aspects of the artificial world, specifically the 
emergence of trade networks. We characterize the 
structure of these networks and extract information 
from the simulations to explain their origin.  
Simulation results for such simplified trade 
scenarios cannot be validated directly against real-
world data. Therefore, we have used the following 
verification criteria to ensure that the model is 
internally consistent and accurately reflects our barter 
economy. 
As in a real economy, repeated interactions 
between individual traders should give rise to 
macroeconomic patterns, and these emergent 
phenomena should be recognizable. They include 
metrics such as trade price, trade distance, and 
traders’ final utilities, as well as details of trade such as 
the number of trades and the number of searches. As 
the unit distance cost is varied, these metrics should 
change in ways that should be readily explainable. 
 In addition, the results should not qualitatively 
change when critical model parameters, such as the 
total population of traders and the maximum initial 
allocation of goods, are varied within reasonable limits. 
These parameter variations, including variations of the 
unit distance cost, constitute a detailed model 
sensitivity analysis.  
We report results for a single population of traders 
and a fixed maximum initial allocation due to space 
constraints. Each data point in the following figures 
was obtained by averaging the results from three 
replications of a particular simulation using three 
different pseudo-random seeds. 
 
RESULTS 
 
We present our main simulation results in this 
section. Figures 2 through 9 display the salient 
features of trade in this barter economy as a function 
of the unit distance cost.  
Figure 2 shows that the average trade price for the 
GMR (“globally mixed random”) allocation is stable 
and very close to 1 as expected, since there are nearly 
equal amounts of g1 and g2 in the world. The standard 
deviation is low and stable as well. The distance-
based transaction cost has almost no effect because 
traders can easily find trade partners nearby who have 
different initial endowments.  
In contrast, the average trade price for the LCAR 
(“local comparative advantage random”) allocation is 
highly sensitive to transaction cost. As the cost 
increases, traders have to contend with a shrinking 
pool of potential trade partners who may not have the 
right ratios of g1 and g2 in the LCAR scenario. Traders 
who are situated close to the border between the 
eastern and western regions might be able to find 
attractive deals across the border, but in general, local 
scarcities make the trade price highly volatile and 
location-specific. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Trade price versus transaction cost. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Trade distance versus transaction cost. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the average trade distance 
declines rapidly as the transaction cost is increased. 
The trade distance is higher initially for LCAR, since 
traders have to look farther for profitable trade 
opportunities. But a unit distance cost of 0.05 or larger 
makes long-distance trade unprofitable in general and 
reduces the trade distance. Above this point, the total 
number of trades declines in the LCAR scenario as 
seen in Figure 4, while it is nearly unchanged for GMR 
due to the proximity of good trading partners. 
Figure 5 shows that increasing search effort is 
required to find good trade partners as the unit 
distance cost increases. In the case of GMR, there is a 
modest but steady increase in the number of 
searches. For LCAR, the number of searches 
increases quickly at first but declines after the cost 
exceeds about 0.05 (coinciding with the decline in the 
number of trades), suggesting that there are 
significantly reduced trade opportunities at higher 
transaction costs when the initial allocation of goods is 
geographically skewed. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Total number of trades versus transaction 
cost. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Total number of searches versus 
transaction cost. 
 
Consequently, the final average utility of the trader 
population decreases modestly as the unit distance 
cost is increased in the case of GMR, but undergoes a 
large drop at about a cost of 0.05 for LCAR, as seen in 
Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Final utility versus transaction cost. 
 
The final utility for LCAR is about the same as the 
GMR scenario when there is no transaction cost, 
which demonstrates that unconstrained trade can 
efficiently move goods between traders and achieve a 
level of utility that is nearly independent of initial 
allocations. LCAR does require more searches and 
trades in order to overcome geographical differences 
in the initial allocation.  
As the unit distance cost increases in the LCAR 
scenario, geographical differences in the initial 
allocation translate into lower final utilities, more 
volatile prices, more dispersion in the final utilities, and 
significantly more effort to achieve a given level of 
average utility. Our model at this point is producing 
global economic patterns that are consistent and 
rational. 
 
Figure 7. Trade efficiency versus transaction cost. 
 
 
Figure 8. Search efficiency versus transaction cost. 
 
Given that the final utility of the trader population is 
an important economic outcome in our trade model, 
Figures 7 and 8 show the efficiency with which this 
outcome is achieved as the unit distance cost is 
varied. In the GMR case, the final average utility per 
trade is nearly constant regardless of the transaction 
cost, while the final utility per search decreases 
modestly due to the slightly increased search effort as 
a result of the transaction cost. The trade and search 
efficiencies in the LCAR case are much worse, 
particularly as the unit distance cost is initially 
increased, and then the efficiencies improve at higher 
costs. 
 
Figure 9. Environmental efficiency versus 
transaction cost. 
 
Figure 9 shows the environmental efficiency of the 
economy, as measured by the final utility per unit of 
greenhouse gas emissions, in response to the 
transaction cost. We assume that greenhouse gas 
emissions produced by each trade are proportional to 
the quantity of goods and the shipping distance. The 
environmental efficiency in the GMR case increases 
rapidly at low costs and then stabilizes at higher costs. 
Once again, the efficiency in the LCAR case 
significantly lags the GMR case, but shows an 
improving trend at higher costs 
Having examined the functioning of the economy 
under the distance-based transaction cost, we now 
turn our attention to the emergence of trade networks. 
Individual traders are the nodes or vertices in these 
networks, and transactions between traders form the 
links or edges.  
The GMR scenario for initial allocation of goods 
has proven to be highly resilient in response to the 
transaction cost. We investigate the reasons by 
examining the network topologies for this case. Figure 
10 shows the structure of the trade network without 
any transaction cost during the first round of trade. The 
dots indicate nodes that have not participated in trades 
yet. After many rounds of trade, it develops the 
appearance of a random network. In Figure 11, we see 
a very different trade network emerging after six 
rounds of trade under a unit distance cost of 0.05. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Trade network without transaction cost 
(GMR). 
 
Figure 12 highlights the difference between the 
networks depicted in Figures 10 and 11. As the cost 
increases, the average number of links per node (the 
average degree of the network) drops quickly. The 
network no longer appears to be a random network. It 
starts to form a number of local hubs. Most 
interestingly, our simulations show that the basic 
network structure gels in the first few rounds of trade, 
and then the structure is reinforced and remains stable 
during subsequent trade rounds. Figure 12 also shows 
that the average degree stabilizes to a large extent in 
the GMR case for unit distance costs at and above 
0.05, which correlates with stability and resilience in 
economic performance. In the LCAR case, the degree 
changes significantly until a cost of 0.1, and then 
continues to change at a slower rate for higher costs.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Trade network with Cost=0.05 (GMR). 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Average degree versus transaction cost. 
 
The network degree distribution in the GMR case 
for all the unit distance costs is shown in Figures 13 
and 14. Without a distance cost, the distribution is 
somewhat bimodal, with the second peak indicating 
that a significant number of nodes are of high degree.  
When a very low unit distance cost (0.001) is applied, 
the distribution shifts dramatically to the left where the 
degree is much smaller.  
For medium and high costs (0.05 through 0.25), 
Figure 14 indicates that most nodes are of very small 
degree (typically less than 4 links per node), but a few 
nodes have a larger number of connections. These 
higher-degree nodes become the hubs in the trade 
network. The resulting networks resemble power or 
scale-free networks [6] but the characteristic is limited 
by the small network size. Over 70 percent of the 
nodes have at least two connections, suggesting some 
degree of clustering in the neighborhoods around the 
hubs. 
For comparison, Figure 15 shows that the network 
in the LCAR case remains random until the cost 
approaches 0.15, and then it too exhibits scale-free 
properties. The network topology and the economic 
performance both stabilize to some extent at these 
higher unit distance costs.  
Our results are consistent with Wilhite’s study [4] of 
fixed economic networks, which showed that the 
power network is a highly efficient structure that can 
quickly redistribute goods without suffering from undue 
search costs and produce a more equitable outcome 
than many other topologies. Even though we did not 
start with a fixed network, the emerged network in the 
GMR scenario displays a similar degree of efficiency 
for a wide range of transaction costs. 
 
 
Figure 13. Degree distribution (no cost and very low 
cost – GMR). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Degree distribution (medium and high 
costs – GMR). 
 
 
Figure 15. Degree distribution (medium and high 
costs – LCAR). 
 
 
Figure 16. Distribution of average initial utility (GMR). 
 
Figure 16, which plots the average initial utility 
(initial value of g1 * initial value of g2) as a function of 
node degree, provides some insight into what causes 
a trader to become a hub in distance-constrained 
trade. The nodes (traders) that end up with the largest 
number of links generally start with low initial utility, 
and hence the largest motivation to engage in trade in 
order to improve their individual utility. This motivation 
to trade makes them local trading hubs for their 
neighboring nodes. Some of the traders start with low 
initial utility because their randomly allocated initial 
quantities of g1 and g2 are very unequal. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Our simulation experiments show that a distance-
based transaction cost has a significant impact on 
trade in our artificial world. We have two important 
results in response to the transaction cost. One key 
result is the profound difference in aggregate behavior 
of this simple economy in terms of macroeconomic 
parameters when the method of randomly assigning 
the initial allocations of goods is changed. The other 
key result is the emergence of trade networks within 
the economy. 
Without a transaction cost, trade is highly efficient 
in moving goods between sellers and buyers. A 
geographically skewed initial allocation of goods in the 
LCAR scenario produces nearly the same outcomes 
as the more uniform (but random) initial allocation in 
the GMR scenario. Average trade price is very close to 
1, reflecting the equal amounts of the two goods in the 
artificial world, regardless of how the goods are 
distributed initially. 
As the transaction cost increases, the GMR 
scenario is affected only to a moderate degree. Price 
as well as dispersion in price are nearly the same as in 
the no cost case. Even though the average trade 
distance drops to less than 10 percent compared to 
the no cost case, traders are largely able to 
compensate by searching their local neighborhoods 
more, and engaging in more trades. In the worst case 
(with unit distance cost at 0.25), traders achieve nearly 
85 percent of the final utility compared to the no cost 
case. 
The LCAR scenario produces dramatically different 
results in comparison to GMR. Price becomes highly 
location-specific, resulting in large changes in the 
average price and dispersion as transaction cost 
increases. Trade distance starts out higher than in the 
GMR scenario because traders have to look farther to 
find potential trade partners with sufficiently different 
endowments of the two goods, but the distance drops 
to the GMR level at higher costs. Traders try to 
compensate by engaging in far more searches and 
trades in their neighborhoods as cost increases 
initially. But then trading opportunities shrink so much 
at higher costs that traders ultimately engage in fewer 
trades than the no cost case. As a result, the final 
utility drops to less than 40 percent compared to the 
no cost case. 
The resilience of the GMR scenario suggests an 
evolved structure of trade relationships under the 
surface. This takes the form of a stable trade network 
with some of the characteristics of power or scale-free 
networks. Traders with low initial utility (due to too 
much of one good and too little of the other) are highly 
motivated to trade and become local hubs that others 
can connect to in each small region.  
The hub structure and clustering that emerge in our 
experiments (for GMR, and for LCAR at high costs) 
are ideally suited for local trade with a small long-
distance component. Once such a network has 
formed, the final utility or welfare of the traders 
depends critically on each local region having a 
diverse allocation of tradable goods,  as in the GMR 
case.  
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